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The Standard of Materiality in the
Context of the Proxy Rules:
TSC v. Northway
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.' the Supreme Court
clarified the meaning of the term "material" in Securities Exchange
Commission rule 14a-9. 2 This rule, promulgated by the SEC under sec-
tion 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 forbids the use of
materially false or misleading statements or omissions in connection
with proxy solicitations. TSC involved omissions from a proxy state-
ment that was issued by the defendants, TSC Industries, Inc. and Na-
tional Industries, Inc., in order to gain shareholder approval of a merger
between those two corporations. The Seventh Circuit had determined
that the omissions were material as a matter of law, granting summary
judgment to the plaintiff Northway, Inc. (a shareholder of TSC) on
the issue of the defendants' liability.4  The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that omissions from a proxy statement are material as a matter
of law only when reasonable minds cannot differ in determining that
a reasonable shareholder would have found the omitted facts important
in deciding how to vote.
The TSC decision ended a recent controversy concerning the legal
definition of materiality in the context of the proxy rules. The confu-
sion over the test of materiality had been caused by the Supreme
Court's careless use of dicta in two recent opinions, Mills v. Electric
1. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
2. Rule 14a-9 provides in part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy state-
ment, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, con-
taining any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with re-
spect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has
become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1976).
3. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange
or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered
pursuant to section 781 of this title.
Securities Exchinge Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1970)). 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970) requires registration of all securities traded on a na-
tional securities exchange and of securities traded over the counter when the issuer has total
assets exceeding one million dollars and a class of equity security held by at least five hundred
persons.
4. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 438
(1976).
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Auto-Lite Co.5 and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.6 The con-
troversy centered on whether the omission or misstatement of an item
of information was material if it would be considered important by a
reasonable shareholder, or merely if it might be considered important
by a reasonable shareholder. In TSC the Supreme Court determined
that "an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote."
7
The TSC Court did much more, however, than merely resolve a
semantic dispute over the definition of materiality. Although the issue
in TSC was materiality as a matter of law upon a motion for summary
judgment, the Court dealt with the concept of materiality in a com-
prehensive and far-reaching manner. The Court distinguished the
objective test of materiality from the subjective test of reliance, which
had been eliminated as an element of a rule 14a.-9 action by the Court's
Mills decision. Emphasizing that materiality is a mixed question of
law and fact, the Court went on to develop a three-step analysis of
materiality involving three separate factual determinations.
This Case Comment will examine materiality in its relationship to
reliance and to other types of causation, as that relationship was per-
ceived by the Court in TSC. Furthermore, it will explain in detail the
three-step factual determination that comprised the Supreme Court's
test of materiality in TSC, under which the Court may have injected a
new element into the rule 14a-9 cause of action-proof of culpable
corporate behavior similar in nature to a violation of state corporation
law. Finally, a policy reason for the Court's complicated approach to
materiality will be advanced: to eliminate the advantage of using the
federal proxy rules to attack corporate transactions that could not be
successfully attacked in state court, and thus leave the regulation of
internal corporate affairs to the states.
I. BACKGROUND OF RULE 14A-9
A. Purpose and Scope of Section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 14a 9.
As part of its scheme to prevent a recurrence of the huge losses
to investors that took place prior to 1934, Congress enacted section 14
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The purpose of the section
was to allow for the operation of fair corporate suffrage.8 This goal
5. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
6. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
7. 426 U.S. at 449.
8. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934); H.R. REP. No, 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934). See generally Hanna & Turlingen, Protection of the Public
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was to be attained by requiring that proxy solicitations provide each
shareholder with "adequate knowledge as to the manner in which his
interests are being served" and with an "explanation ... of the real
nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought."9
Under section 14(a) the Securities and Exchange Commission is
authorized to promulgate and enforce rules governing corporate proxy
solicitations. The rules promulgated by the SEC pursuant to section
14(a) set out specific information that must be disclosed in proxy
statements, 10 require certain material to be filed with the SEC," and
delineate management's duty to aid shareholders in their efforts to
solicit proxies or to put proposals before other shareholders.'1 The
most litigated issues in the area of federal Froxy regulation, how-
ever, are those raised by SEC rule 14a-9(a), 1 which has served as an
effective source of protection to investors under the federal securities
laws. 5
Rule 14a-9 has, to a large extent, supplanted state regulation in
the area of proxy solicitation because many procedural and remedial
advantages that are unavailable under existing state securities laws are
offered under the 1934 Act.'6 Rule 14a-9 ostensibly regulates only the
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 251 (1935); Tracy & MacChesncy, The Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 Mica. L. REv. 1025 (1934).
9. S. RP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
10. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3-.14a-5 (1976).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1976).
12. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-7-.14a-8 (1976).
13. See 2 L. Loss, SEactu REGuLATiON 917 (2d ed. 1961).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976).
15. See H.R. Doc. No. 672, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946); 2 L Loss, supra note 13.
at 866.
16. See Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus.
LAw. 991, 997-98 (1976). Among these advantages are the following:
1) Provisions for broad venue and nationwide service of process facilitate suits
brought under the Exchange Act. Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
2) Many states require the posting of security for expenses in a shareholder deriva-
tive action. See, e.g., N.Y. Coma. LAws § 627 (United States Corporation Co. 1972).
This obstacle is not present in the federal courts. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d
824, 837 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
3) Either party may demand a jury trial even if the action is a derivative one.
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970).
4) J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) states clearly that federal courts have
full power to fashion appropriate remedies in any situation in which a violation of the proxy
rules has occurred. The Supreme Court instructed the lower courts to "provide such rem-
edies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose" of the proxy regula-
tions. 377 U.S. at 433. For a general discussion of the remedies granted by the courts
pursuant to Borak, see Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of J.LCase
v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1150 (1965); Note, Private Remedies Available Under Sec-
tion 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 IowA L. REv. 657 (1970).
The problems of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over certain securities violations
have been dealt with- extensively. See, e.g., Loss, State Law and the Proxy Rules, 73 HARv. L
REv. 1249 (1960); Smith, State "Blue-Sky" Lmvs and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 Mica. L
REv. 1135 (1936); Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 HAMv. L. REv.
513 (1958); Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70
HAxv. L. REv. 509 (1957).
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accuracy of statements and the method of soliciting proxies, not the
fairness of the transaction for which the proxies are solicited. 7
However, the scope of the rule is unclear; it has been interpreted on a
case-by-case basis in light of the policies underlying the 1934 Act, and
the courts have expanded the coverage of rule 14a-9 in the course of
providing relief in private actions brought under the rule. The federal
regulation of proxy solicitations has been extended, some believe, to
include the regulation of internal corporate affairs, an area traditionally
left to the individual states.'8 In a rule 14a-9 action "[t]he injury to
the complainant, real or fancied, may, and usually does, include sub-
stantive matters unrelated to the proxy rule violation."19
B. Elements of a Private Cause of Action under Rule 14a-9.
Since 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, in which a private cause of action
was made available under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act,20 the courts
have engaged in a continuing effort to define the elements that con-
stitute a cause of action under rule 14a-9. 2' A summary of the issues
arising under the rule is as follows:
22
1. Parties. Borak made a cause of action under section 14(a)
available to any corporation or individual suing individually or deriva-
tively for injury caused by noncompliance with the proxy rules pro-
mulgated under that section. 23  Since section 14(a) refers to any per-son who solicits a proxy or allows his name to be used in a proxy
17. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
18. See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S,
939 (1961); Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law". An Assessment, 78 HARv. L, R V. 1146
(1965); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law cf Corporations by Implication
Through Rule lob-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964).
The inadequacy of state supervision of corporate behavior has been amply documented.
See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROURTY 83-84,
129, 186, 216-17 (1968); Emerson & Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Ef-
fective Stockholder Participation, 59 YALE L.J. 635, 635-37 (1950); Jennings, The Role of the
States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD, 193 (1958);
Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONlr MP. PROD. 177
(1958); Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"? 50 CORNLL L.Q. 599
(1965).
It is believed that the ineffective state supervision of corporations and their securities
triggered the federal securities laws. 1 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 105-07; Comment, The Blue
Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REv. 713, 714-15 (1958).
19. Demmler, Private Suits Based on Violations of the Proxy Rules, 20 U. PiTT. L. Ray.
587, 591 (1959).
20. 377 U.S. 426, 430 (1964).
21. Technically, the private cause of action authorized by Lorak arises under section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act when there is a contravention of one of the rules promulgated thereunder.
However, for purposes of brevity, the cause of action will be rererred to here as arising under
rule 14a-9.
22. For a complete discussion of the elements of a rule l4a-9 action and the issues sur-
rounding them, see Note, False and Misleading Proxy Statements, 3 GA. L. REv. 162 (1968),
23. 377 U.S. at 430-31.
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solicitation,24 rule 14a-9 can reach a potentially unlimited class of
defendants.
2. Registration under section 12 of the Exchange Act of 1934.
No proxy solicitation is subject to the SEC proxy rules unless it is made
in respect of a security required to be registered under section 12 of
the 1934 Act.25  Certain securities are exempt from registration under
section 12 or by virtue of the rules promulgated under that section;26
furthermore, certain solicitations are exempted by the proxy rules
under section 14(a).27
3. Solicitation. This term, defined in rule 14a-l, 28 has been in-
terpreted very broadly. It is clear that solicitation includes more than
active solicitation. Rule 14a-1 has been applied not only to manage-
ment and to shareholders but- also to those who participated only in a
very general sense in the solicitation.2 Furthermore, the rule applies
to any type of communication to shareholders that is part of a plan
ending in a proxy solicitation, even when the communication is not
formally labelled as a solicitation of proxies.30
4. A false or misleading statement or an omission causing infor-
mation in the proxy statement to be false or misleading. The SEC
has clarified what types of statements or omissions are misleading by
listing in a note to rule 14a-9 certain items that may be misleading.
31
The list is not exhaustive, however, and extensive litigation has been
conducted to determine what information must be disclosed and what
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
25. Id.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12a-l-.12a-6 (1976).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (1976).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1() (1976) provides:
(f) Solicitation. (1) The terms "solicit" and "solicitation" include:
(i) Any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a form
of proxy,
(ii) Any request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy, or
(iii) The furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication-to security holders
under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding
or revocation of a proxy.
29. Union Pacific R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 403 (N.D. IlL 1964);
H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 34-7208 (Jan. 7, 1964), 2 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 24,106.
30. SEC v. Okn, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943). But see Smallwood v. Pearl Brew-
ing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 599-601 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(b) (1976) provides:
NoTm: The following are some examples of what, depending upon particular
facts and circumstances, may be misleading within the meaning of this section:
(a) Predictions as to specific future market values, earnings, or dividends.
(b) Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personal
reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning improper, illegal or im-
moral conduct or associations, without factual foundation.
(c) Failure to so identify a proxy statement, form of proxy and other soliciting
material as to clearly distinguish it from the soliciting material of any other person or
persons soliciting for the same meeting or subject matter.
(d) Claims made prior to a meeting regarding the results of a solicitation.
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form of disclosure must be used to ensure that shareholders are being
afforded a complete picture of the proposal presented for their ap-
proval. 2
5. Standard of culpability. The Supreme Court has not indicated
whether negligence or scienter is the proper standard to be applied
under rule 14a-9, 33 but the recent decision in Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc. contains a careful analysis of the issue. The Second
Circuit held that no fraudulent motive or reckless disregard need be
proved; however, the court was careful to point out that in the situation
presented the corporate defendant had been in control of the corpora-
tion that it later acquired through the use of a joint proxy statement
that was found to be misleading. 4 Thus, the way was left open to
apply a scienter requirement in a situation in which the defendants do not
have such obvious control over, and interest in, the outcome of the proxy
solicitation." Other courts that have considered the standard of care
required under rule 14a-9 have simply stated that negligence is enough
to impose liability.
36
6. Materiality. A misleading statement or omission in a proxy
statement must be material before a defendant can be held accountable
under rule 14a-9.3 The materiality of a statement or omission in a
proxy statement refers to the effect of that statement or omission
upon a "reasonable shareholder. '38  The element of materiality func-
tions as a limitation on the disclosure requirements contained in the
proxy rules. It is used to ensure that only necessary and relevant
32. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1291-98 (2d Cir. 1973);
General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 832, 836 (5.D.N.Y.), af/'d, 403 F.2d 159
(2d Cir. 1968).
33. The Supreme Court expressly declined to reach this issue in TSC. 426 U.S. at
444-45 n.7. However, in the same footnote it referred to its opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Hochfelder held that in the absence of a finding of scienter there
can be no liability under rule 1Ob-5. Id. at 214. Because the Court, in SEC v. National Secu-
rities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), held that there is an overlap in coverage between rules lOb-5
and 14a-9 with respect to misleading proxy statements, it would seem inconsistent to have dif-
ferent standards of culpability under the two rules, at least with respect to proxy solicitation.
The Court's reference to Hochfelder in TSC may be an indication that the Court will require
scienter as a prerequisite to liability under rule 14a-9 when it finally deals with the issue. But
see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299-1301 (2d Cir. 1973); Gould v. Ameri-
can Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 861-63 (D. Del. 1972); 5 L. Loss, supra note 13,
at 2864-65; Note, The Proper Standard of Fault for Imposing Personal Liability on Corporate
Directors for False or Misleading Statements in Proxy Solicitations Under Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 14a-9, 34 Oio Sr. L.J. 670, 681 (1973) therein-
after cited as Note, Proper Standard].
34. 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973).
35. For a suggestion that a "modified scienter" standard be adopted in the case of out-
side directors see Note, Proper Standard, supra note 33, at 688-90.
36. See Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 858-65 (D, Del, 1972);
Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D. I11. 1970); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F.
Supp. 1096, 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affid, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
989 (1970); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1976).
38. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
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information is disclosed to shareholders in the proxy statement,3'
thus avoiding a situation in which "the data submitted to the stock-
holders would be so bulky and unwieldy . . . that it might be more
confusing than useful to the stockholders.
' 0
The requirement of materiality .also protects defendants from
liability for violations so trivial that they could not possibly have
41caused injury. This protection results from the fact that materiality
embodies a connection between a technical violation of the securities
laws and an injury to the complainant; it is therefore closely related
to causation.42 The element of causation is a separate requirement in
a rule 14a-9 cause of action, however, and must be analyzed before the
relationship between materiality and causation can be explored.
7. Causation. The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,)43 which made clear that two different types
of causation must be distinguished in analyzing a rule 14a-9 claim.
In its decision in Mills the Seventh Circuit had applied a "but for"
test, requiring plaintiff to show that the corporate transaction com-
plained of-a merger-could not have occurred if the proxy statement
had not been misleading.45 This test apparently required two types
of causal connection: a causal link between the proxy statement and
the shareholder's vote (subsequently referred to as vote-causation),
which this court defined in terms of reliance; and a causal link be-
tween the proxy solicitation and the execution of the merger (sub-
sequently referred to as transaction-causation).4 6  The Supreme Court
expressly separated these two aspects of causation in Mills, substi-
tuting materiality for reliance as the test of vote-causation, while
maintaining the requirement of transaction-causation. 47
39. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 600 n.29 (5th Cir. 1974); Cohen, "Tuth
in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1351-52 (1966); Knauss, A Reappraisal of
the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REy. 607, 618-19 (1974).
40. Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
41. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
42. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975), rerld, 426
U.S. 438 (1976); Comment, Elements of a Cause of Action Under Section 14(a) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934: The Priorities of Proxy Regulation, 42 TF-tP. L.Q. 36, 38 (1968);
Note, False and Misleading Proxy Statements, 3 GA. L. REv. 162, 179 n.1 18 (1968).
43. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
44. 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
45. Id. at 435-36.
46. "Vote-causation" and "transaction-causation" are used here to denote a distinction
that has not been clearly made by the courts. The two phrases will be used as a shorthand
method of dealing with cases in which causation was an issue, although the courts involved did
not necessarily approach the issue with the dichotomy represented by these terms in mind.
47. 396 U.S. at 385. The Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of w hether
transaction-causation could be established when management had enough votes to consummate
the desired transaction without the necessity of soliciting proxies. Id. at 385 n.7. Lower courts
have had difficulty in dealing with this issue. In Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766.
770-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), it was held that when defendants had majority voting power and minority
voters could not affect the outcome of the vote, no cause of action under rule 14a-9 had
arisen. Accord, Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758, 762-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
1977]
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The Court's holding in Mills carries an implicit recognition that
the concept of materiality embodies a type of causal connection; how-
ever, materiality's distinction from reliance and from transaction-
causation must be kept in mind. Transaction-causation refers to
whether the successful accomplishment of the transaction for which
approval was sought was actually dependent upon the outcome of the
proxy solicitation. Reliance is a subjective test of vote-causation 8
and refers to whether the votes of the individual shareholders in ques-
tion were decisively affected by a misleading proxy statement. The
standard of materiality, on the other hand, is couched in objective
language, in terms of the effect of a misleading proxy statement on a
"reasonable shareholder" and deals with probabilities, not actualities.4 9
Materiality may be defined as an objective test of vote-causation, as
opposed to the subjective test of vote-causation represented by the
element of reliance.
C. The Need for a Clear Definition of Materiality
As a result of the broad interpretations given the other elements
of a rule 14a-9 cause of action and the elimination of the requirement
of reliance in Mills, materiality became the last line of defense for
corporations and individuals involved in litigation concerning viola-
tions of the proxy rules.50 The need for a clear definition of ma-
teriality became pronounced. Confusion developed over the legal
standard of materiality under rule 14a-9, and the Mills decision pro-
vided no guidance. Lower courts spent much time and energy deal-
ing with whether an item of information was material if it would be
considered important by a reasonable shareholder or if it might be
considered important by a reasonable shareholder.51 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to the defendants in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc. specifically to resolve a conflict between circuits 2
on the issue of whether materiality is determined by what a reason-
able shareholder would, or merely might, find important.
Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Bu,: in Laurenzano v. Einbender,
264 F. Supp. 356, 360-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), the court held that even when defendants had voting
control, the omission of material facts in a proxy statement might have an effect on the voting
results. See generally Note, Causation and Liability in Private 4ctions for Proxy Violations,
80 Yale LJ. 107 (1970).
48. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); In Re Scientific Control Corp., 71 F.R.D. 491, 513 (SD.N.Y. 1976).
49. Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 n.18 (10th Cir. 19701.
50. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448.49 (1976); Gerstlc v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. See, e.g., Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330-32 (7th Cir. 1975)
rev'd, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603.04 (5th Cir. 1974);
Gersdle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973); Kaufman v. Lawrence,
386 F. Supp. 12, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (SD.N.Y.
1967).
52. 426 U.S. 438, 443 (1976).
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II. TSC INDUSTRIES, INC. V. NORTHWAY, INC.
A. The Facts
In December 1969, National Industries, Inc.53 acquired TSC In-
dustries, Inc.54 by exchanging National "series B" preferred stock and
warrants for TSC common and " series one" preferred stock.55  Prior
to the merger, National owned approximately 34% of TSC's voting
securities, which had been acquired by purchases throughout 1969
from the founder and principal shareholder of TSC, Charles E.
Schmidt, and from other sources. National also had five representa-
tives on TSC's board of ten, one of whom was chairman of the TSC
board (Stanley R. Yarmouth, president and chief executive officer of
National), and one of whom was chairman of TSCs executive com-
mittee (Charles F. Simonelli, executive vice president of National).56
Shareholder approval for the merger 7 was obtained by means of a
joint proxy statement issued by TSC and National on November 12,
1969.
The adequacy of the proxy statement was attacked by North-
way, Inc.,"8 a TSC shareholder. In a complaint filed in federal dis-
trict court, Northway alleged that the proxy statement contained omis-
sions of material facts in violation of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9.59
Its subsequent motion for partial summary judgment on the liability
issue raised the question of whether the following omissions from the
joint proxy statement were material:
1) The proxy statement did not reveal that Yarmouth was the
chairman of the TSC board of directors or that Simonelli was the
chairman of the TSC executive committee. All other facts concern-
ing the relationship between National and TSC were prominently
disclosed in the proxy statement. °
2) The proxy statement did not disclose that TSC and National
53. National was a Kentucky corporation with common stock and preferred stock listed
on the New York Stock Exchange and warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange.
54. TSC was a Delaware corporation with common stock and preferred stock listed on the
New York Stock Exchange.
55. The exchange rate was .6 share of National "series B" preferred stock and one
National warrant for each share of TSC "series one" preferred stock, .5 share of National
"series B" preferred stock and 1-1/2 National warrants for each share of TSC common stock.
National "series B" preferred stock was convertible into .75 share of National common stock,
and a National warrant entitled the holder to purchase a share of National common stock for
S21.40 until October 31, 1978.
56. All three National nominees on the TSC board who attended the meeting at which
the directors' approval of the merger was obtained abstained from voting upon the merger
proposal, as did one other director.
57. Delaware law requires shareholder approval of transactions of this type. DEL
CODE tit. 8, § 275 (1975).
58. Northway was a private Delaware holding company organized by an individual
investor to hold his investments.
59. 426 U.S. at 438.
60. Id. at 452.
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had stated in reports required to be filed with the SEC that National
"may be deemed to be a parent of TSC as that term is defined in the
Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933. "6l
3) The proxy statement did not disclose the contents of a letter
sent to National by the investment banking firm of Hornblower &
Weeks-Hemphill that valued the National warrants to be issued in
the merger at $1.75 lower than the current market value disclosed in
the proxy statement. The letter from Hornblower also predicted a
possible drop in the value of the warrants because of the large number
of warrants to be issued in the exchange.62
4) The proxy statement failed to disclose that 8.5% of the pur-
chases of National common stock during the period between the
initial purchases of TSC voting securities by National and the date of
the joint proxy solicitation had been made by National and by
Madison Fund, Inc. Madison was a mutual fund whose director was
board chairman of National and whose president was employed by
National as a consultant. Northway contended that although the
exchange to TSC shareholders involved National preferred stock and
warrants, the relationship between Madison and National indicated a
possible collusive attempt to manipulate the price of National common
stock, which may have artificially raised the market price of National
preferred stock and warrants.
3
The district court denied Northway's motion for partial summary
judgment, refusing to hold that the omissions complained of were
material as a matter of law.64  An interlocutory appeal was taken
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
61. Id. National filed form 13D in compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970) and 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1976). Item Four of the form requires that if the purpose of the acqul~i-
tion of securities is to gain control of the business of the issuer, any plans or proposals of
the acquiring party to make major changes in that business mist be disclosed. In response
to this requirement National indicated that it might be a "parent" of TSC. TSC filed the same
information with the SEC in its forms 10-K and 8-K in compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1970) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-10, 11 (1976). "Parent" is defined under the Exchange Act at
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(a), (f), (k) (1976) as follows:
(a) Affiliate. An "affiliate" of, or a person "affiliated" with, a specified person, is a
person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is
controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified.
(f) Control. The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled
by" and "under common control with") means the possession, directly or indirectly, of
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contra:t, or otherwise.
(k) Parent. A "parent" of a specified person is an affiliate controlling such person
directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries.
62. 512 F.2d at 334-35.
63. 426 U.S. at 460-61.
64. 361 F. Supp. at 114, 117.
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B. Seventh Circuit Decision
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of sum-
mary judgment on the issue of liability. The court concluded that the
test of materiality to be applied was whether an omitted fact was "of
such a character that it might have been considered important by a
reasonable shareholder who was in the process of determining how
to vote."65  Using this test, the court found all four omissions in the
proxy statement material as a matter of law.
1) The Positions of Yarmouth and Simonelli on the TSC Board
and the Information Contained in the SEC Filings. The court of ap-
peals stated that there remained a genuine issue of fact with regard
to National's control over TSC.66 However, the court held that the
omission of the positions of the National nominees on the TSC board
and the omission of the information filed with the SEC by TSC and
National were material regardless of whether National actually con-
trolled TSC. The court felt that the omission of these facts was ma-
terial as a matter of law because the information could have indicated
to a TSC shareholder that less than best efforts had been used by the
management of TSC to negotiate favorable terms for its stockholders in
the merger transaction with National.67
2) The Hornblower Letter. The proxy statement had empha-
sized an opinion letter to TSC from Hornblower that affirmed the fairness
to TSC stockholders of the terms of the exchange of TSC shares for
National shares.68  The court of appeals noted that the first letter's
emphasis upon a "substantial premium over current market values,"
when viewed in conjunction with a summary three pages later in the
proxy statement of the current market values of TSC and National
securities, might have led shareholders to calculate, and thus to ex-
pect, a premium substantially higher than that actually received. This
miscalculation could have been avoided by inclusion in the proxy
statement of the subsequent letter from Hornblower to National
predicting a drop in the value of the National warrants. Therefore,
in the opinion of the court, the omission from the proxy statement of
the information contained in the second Hornblower letter was
material as a matter of law.69
65. 512 F.2d at 332 (quoting Mills, 396 U.S. at 384).
66. Id. at 329.
67. Id. at 333.
68. Page six of the proxy statement contained the following language:
In such opinion, [Hornblower] considered, among other things, the current market prices
of the securities of both corporations, the high redemption price of the National Series
B Preferred Stock, the dividend and debt service requirements of both corporations, the
substantial premium over current market values represented by the securities being
offered to TSC stockholders and the increased dividend income.
512 F.2d at 334 n.16.
69. 512 F.2d at 335.
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3) Purchases by National and Madison of National Common
Stock. The Seventh Circuit's reasoning concerning this omission was
analogous to its reasoning on the control issue. Although collusion
between National and Madison could not be assumed for purposes of
summary judgment, the omitted information with regard to the pur-
chases was material as a matter of law because its inclusion might have
led stockholders to perceive the possibility of market manipulation,
thereby affecting their judgment of the value of the proposed ex-
change.70
The Seventh Circuit reached its conclusion that all four omissions
in the proxy statement were material by defining "materiality" to in-
clude information misstated in or omitted from a proxy statement that
might be relevant to a reasonable shareholder's voting decision.71 The
court had accurately concluded that the "woul(d" standard of mate-
riality was a test of something more than relevancy, that it was a means
of determining vote-causation.72 Interpreting the Supreme Court's
decision in Mills to mean that vote-causation was no longer an ele-
ment of a rule 14a-9 cause of action, the Seventh Circuit believed
that use of the "would" standard was precluded: "[A]ny test of
materiality which requires a finding of some probability that the
omitted fact would affect the voting process necessitates the same
difficult proofs the Supreme Court sought to avoid by eliminating the
need for independent proof of causation or reliance.""3 The court
was unable to distinguish the subjective test of vote-causation (re-
liance) eliminated in Mills from the objective test of vote-causation
represented by the "would" standard of materiality.74  The court
believed both tests of vote-causation were precluded by Mills. There-
fore it applied the "might" standard of materiality to determine
whether any of the information omitted from the proxy statement of
TSC and National might have been relevant to a reasonable share-
holder's decision." It was this approach to materiality that concerned
the Supreme Court.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Proper Standard of Materiality
The Court characterized the materiality standard applied by the
Seventh Circuit as "too suggestive of mere possibility, however un-
likely,"76 and set forth the following as the proper standard of
70. Id. at 336.
71. Id. at 331 n.13.
72. Id. at 331.
73. Id.
74. See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
75. 512 F.2d at 331 n.13.
76. 426 U.S. at 449 (quoting Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1302).
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materiality: "[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote."77 The Seventh Circuit had interpreted Mills
as precluding the consideration of vote-causation in a 14a-9 action.7s
The TSC Court corrected this erroneous interpretation of Mills by
emphasizing that the Mills case had eliminated only the subjective
test of reliance, i.e., proof that a defect in a proxy statement had
actually affected the outcome of the shareholder vote.79 The Court
noted that the "would" test of materiality is an objective test of vote-
causation involving the reactions of a hypothetical "reasonable in-
vestor" to misstatements or omissions in a proxy statement.8 There-
fore, the Court indicated, proof of materiality by means of the "would"
standard does not contravene the holding in Mills.8
TSC makes clear that the materiality of a misstatement or omis-
sion in a proxy statement must be proved by showing the probable
causative effect of the defect upon a reasonable shareholder, not by
showing the mere relevancy of a defect to a reasonable shareholder's
decision. After TSC and Mills, therefore, a plaintiff in a rule 14a-9
action must prove a causal connection between the proxy solicitation
and the transaction for which approval was sought (transaction-
causation), and that a reasonable shareholder would have found the
alleged defect in the proxy statement important (materiality or objec-
tive vote-causation).
B. The Court's Treatment of Mills and Affiliated Ute
The Supreme Court was indirectly responsible for the broad
standard of materiality used by the Seventh Circuit. Language con-
tained in two prior opinions of the Court had caused considerable
confusion among the lower courts concerning the proper test. In
TSC the Court's first task was to resolve the conflicts caused by Mills
and by Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.8 2
The language with which the Supreme Court, in Mills, had elimi-
nated the element of reliance in a rule 14a-9 cause of action created
confusion concerning the definition of materiality.
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been
shown to be "material," as it was found to be here, that determination
itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a
character that it might have been considered important by a reason-
able shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote. This
77. 426 U.S. at 449.
78. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
79. 426 U.S. at 446-47.
80. Id. at 445.
81. Id. at 447.
82. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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requirement that the defect have a significant propensity to affect the
voting process is found in the express terms of Rule 14a-9, and it ade-
quately serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be
established by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the trans-
action for which approval is sought, that correction of the defect or im-
position of liability would not further the interests protected by § 14(a).83
The Seventh Circuit had also decided the Mills case and had
found certain omissions in a merger proxy statement to be material
as a matter of law.84  The facts omitted in the proxy statement were
that the acquiring company, Mergenthaler Linotype Company, had
nominated all eleven directors of the acquired company, Electric
Auto-Lite, and controlled the operations of that company.8" Other
facts concerning the relationship between Mergenthaler and Electric
Auto-Lite had been disclosed in the proxy statement. But the state-
ment emphasized that the board of directors of Electric Auto-Lite had
recommended the merger, and the Seventh Circuit concluded that equal
emphasis should have been given to the lack of autonomy of that board.
The court reached this conclusion without articulating the standard of
materiality it was applying.
8 6
The Supreme Court specifically declined to review the Seventh
Circuit's determination of materiality in Mills.17  And yet the Court
accepted the finding of materiality by the court of appeals for the
purpose of dealing with the issue of causation,88 describing that finding
as embodying a conclusion that a reasonable shareholder might have
considered the omissions important. Thus, it is no surprise that the
Mills case, in which the omissions from the proxy statement were very
similar to those in TSC, was relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in
deciding TSC.
In TSC the Supreme Court was quick to point out that the Seventh
Circuit's reliance on Mills was misplaced because Mills dealt solely
with reliance.89 The Court further noted that the words suggesting a
"general notion of materiality" in Mills were those containing a "ref-
erence to materiality as a 'requirement that the defect have a signifi-
cant propensity to affect the voting process.' "90 The Court could also
have distinguished TSC from Mills on its facts, because control was
a proven fact in Mills, known conclusively by the defendants when
83. 396 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added).
84. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated, 396 U.S. 375
(1970).
85. 396 U.S. at 378.
86. 403 F.2d at 433-35.
87. 396 U.S. at 381 n.4.
88. Id. at 384.
89. 426 U.S. at 446-47.
90. Id. at 447. The Court was referring to the voting process of an individual shareholder,
not to the outcome of a shareholder election.
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they issued their joint proxy statement.91 However, the Seventh
Circuit was unable to perceive these differences, and it was the Mills
decision which caused that court's confusion over the standard of
materiality to be applied in TSC.
The confusion was compounded by the Supreme Court's decision
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States. In Affiliated Ute the Court
dealt with the issue of reliance under rule lOb-5, eliminating that
requirement as it had under rule 14a-9 in Mills. 92  In its opinion the
Court used language similar to that carelessly used in Mills: "All that
is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a
reasonable investor might have considered them important in the
making of this decision."9 3  In TSC the Court deprecated the Seventh
Circuit's reliance on this decision as well:
The conclusion embodied in the quoted language was simply that positive
proof of reliance is unnecessary when materiality is established, and in
order to reach that conclusion it was not necessary to articulate a
precise definition of materiality, but only to give a "sense, of the notion.
The quoted language did not purport to do more. 4
With hindsight, then, the Court clarified its misleading language,
but in the period between 1970, when Mills was decided, and 1976,
when TSC was decided, the meaning of materiality was disputed in
the lower courts, and this dispute was not limited to rule 14a-9
cases.95 The confusion of the courts was well summarized in Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.:
Some probability that the investor's decision would be affected by a
disclosure is a prerequisite to a finding of materiality. The degree of
probability that it would have such an impact has been differently
stated by the courts. They have focused on the effect on the reasonable
purchaser, variously asking whether he "might" or "would" or "might
well have been' affected by the information; they have asked whether
it is "reasonably certain" that the information would have had a "sub-
stantial effect" or whether it "might" have had a "significant propensity"
to affect him.96
91. 403 F.2d at 433-34.
92. 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
93. Id.
94. 426 U.S. at 447 n.9.
95. See, e.g., Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir.
1973) (15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970)); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs. 483 F.2d 247,
251 (2d Cir. 1973) (15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970)); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1298-1301 (2d Cir. 1973) (rule 14a-9); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269
(3d Cir. 1972) (rule 10b-5); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir.
1970) (rule lOb-5); Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 827-28 (D. DeL
1974) (rules 14a-9 & lOb-5); Puma v. Marriott, 363 F. Supp. 750, 757 (D. Del. 1973) (rules
14a-9 and lOb-5); First Sur. Corp. v. Community Bank, 337 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (C.D. Cal.
1971) (rule 14a-9); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169, 173 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (rule 14a-9);
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (rules 14a-9 & lOb-5).
96. 332 F. Supp. 544, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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The Supreme Court resolved the dilemma in TSC, opting for the
"would" standard of materiality.
C. The Court's Application of the "Would" Standard:
The Three-Step Determination of Materiality
Early in the TSC opinion the Court set out a theoretical frame-
work for determining the materiality of a misstatement or omission in
a proxy statement under the "would" standard. 97 The framework
involves three levels of factual determinations. First, the facts alleged
to have been misstated or omitted must be proved. The Court noted,
however, that these "underlying objective facts, which will often be
free from dispute, are merely the starting point for the ultimate de-
termination of materiality"; 9 the importance or materiality of these
misstated or omitted facts cannot be determined without an analysis of
the inferences to which these facts would reasonably lead. The second
step, then, in the Court's determination of materiality is a factual
determination of the inferences that would be drawn by a reasonable
shareholder from the underlying objective facts alleged to be mis-
stated or omitted in the proxy statement. The Court pointed out that
the assessment of these inferences is "peculiarly . . . for the trier of
fact,"99 and that the "jury's unique competence in applying the 'rea-
sonable man' standard"10° would generally prevent the drawing of these
inferences as a matter of law upon a motion for summary judgment.
The third step in the Court's materiality analysis is a determination
of the importance to a reasonable shareholder of the inferences that
would have been drawn from the information omitted from the proxy
statement. Resolution of this issue is "the ultimate determination of
materiality."10' 1 However, it cannot be reached until the two previous
factual determinations have been made.102
Although the Court did not reiterate its method for determining
materiality in the course of discussing each of the four omissions in
the proxy statement of TSC and National, its three-step analysis is
implicit in its treatment of each of the issues. The Supreme Court
dealt with the four omissions that had been found to be material by
the Seventh Circuit as follows:
1) Omission of Statement of Yarmouth's and Simonelli's Posi-
tions on the TSC Board. The Seventh Circuit had found the omis-
sion of the positions of Yarmouth and Simonelli on TSC's board to be
material because the information could have indicated to a TSC
97. 426 U.S. at 450.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 450 n.12.
101. Id. at 450.
102. Id.
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shareholder that National controlled TSC and that the negotiations
between National and TSC concerning the merger between the two
companies had been less than fair to the TSC shareholders.10 3 The
Supreme Court, however, noted that the proxy statement contained
sufficient facts to clearly reveal the nature of the relationship between
TSC and National and that the positions of Yarmouth and Simonelli
on TSC's board could be viewed as "additional facts," 1°4 not necessary
to allow a reasonable shareholder to reach an informed decision.
Although the Court did not explicitly go through the three steps
of the materiality analysis it had articulated earlier, the analysis may
be inferred from the opinion as follows: The Court assumed
that the positions of Yarmouth and Simonelli on the TSC board, the
underlying objective facts alleged to be omitted from the proxy state-
ment, were free from dispute. The Court was unwilling, however, to
determine as a matter of law that these facts alone led to an inference
of control of TSC by National. Given the extensive disclosure already
contained in the proxy statement, which indicated some degree of
influence by National over TSC, it was not beyond dispute that
reasonable shareholders would infer the fact of control solely from the
additional information concerning the positions of Yarmouth and
Simonelli on TSC's board. The Court would not allow the inference
of control to be made as a matter of law, and therefore the issue of
the importance of the omission to a reasonable shareholder could not
be reached.
105
2) Omission of Information Contained in SEC Filing. The
Seventh Circuit had held that the omission of the information filed
with the SEC by TSC and National was material regardless of whether
National actually controlled TSC.10 6 The Supreme Court, however,
approached the issue differently, noting that a genuine issue of fact
remained concerning National's control of TSC and assuming for
purposes of summary judgment that National did not control TSC 0 7
The Court believed that if the language used by TSC and National
in their SEC filings had been included in the proxy statement, it would
have been read by shareholders to mean that National clearly con-
trolled TSC. This was not necessarily the meaning of the statement
in the filings that "National may be deemed to be a parent of TSC,"
but the Court was concerned with the possibility that this language
could be interpreted to mean that TSC and National acknowledged a
control relationship between themselves. Assuming, then, as the
Supreme Court did for purposes of summary judgment, that there was
103. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
104. 426 U.S. at 453.
105. Id. at 452-53.
106. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
107. 426 U.S. at 453.
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no control, the information filed with the SEC could not have been
included in the proxy statement without misleading shareholders.
Indeed, if it had been included, the Court stated, a disclaimer of con-
trol or of knowledge of control would have been necessary.' There-
fore, the Court concluded, "The net contribution of including the
contents of the SEC filings accompanied by such disclaimers is not of
such obvious significance, in view of the other facts contained in the
proxy statement, that their exclusion renders the statement materially
misleading as a matter of law."' 0 9
Implicit in the Court's consideration of this issue is the three-
level materiality analysis set out by the Court in the first part of its
opinion. Under this analysis, the issue was disposed of at the second
level: Although the fact that TSC and National had filed the state-
ments with the SEC was undisputed, the Court would not draw the
inference that National controlled TSC from this fact as a matter of
law. That is, the Court was unwilling to hold as a matter of law that a
reasonable shareholder would draw the inference of control from the
information omitted from the proxy statement. Therefore, the issue of
the significance of the omission to a reasonable shareholder, the third
level of the materiality analysis, could not be reached upon a motion
for summary judgment. On remand the trier of fact would have to
determine whether the inference of control would be drawn by a
reasonable shareholder before the significance of that inference could
be considered." 0
In its discussion of the omission of the information contained in
the SEC filings, the Court gave an example of omissions in a proxy
statement, the materiality of which could be determined as a matter of
law because all three steps in the process involved factual determina-
tions upon which reasonable minds could not differ. The Court pointed
to facts suggestive of control which TSC and National had included
in their proxy statement: National's 34% stock interest in TSC and its
five nominees on TSC's board at the time of the proxy solicitation."'
Omission of these facts would have been material as a matter of law
because "even if National did not 'control' TSC, its stock ownership
and position on the TSC board make it quite clear that it enjoyed
some influence over TSC, which would be of obvious importance to
TSC shareholders."' 2  In other words, under the Court's systematic
analysis of materiality, National's 34% stock interest and its nominees
on TSC's board were undisputed facts. Although control could not be




I11. Id. at 453-54 n.15.
112. Id.
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by National over TSC could be inferred as a matter of law. Further-
more, the importance to a reasonable shareholder of this influence
would be obvious and could therefore be determined as a matter of
law.
3) Hornblower Letter. The Court described the issue regarding
this omission as
whether the advice given ... in the subsequent Hornblower letter-
that there may be a decline in the market price of the National Warrants
-had to be disclosed in order to clarify the import of the proxy state-
ment's reference to "the substantial premium over current market
values represented by the securities being offered to TSC stockholders."" 3
The Court did not discuss the materiality of the omission of the lower
valuation of the National warrants contained in the Hornblower letter
because an issue of fact remained to be resolved prior to the applica-
tion of the three-step determination of materiality-whether the omis-
sion of the information in the Hornblower letter was misleading.'"
Stated more precisely in terms of rule 14a-9,15 the factual issue to be
resolved was whether the omission in the proxy statement caused other
statements contained therein to be misleading.
The Court focused upon the two parts of the proxy statement that
could possibly have been misleading as a result of the omission. The
first was the reference in the proxy statement to the "substantial
premium to be received by the TSC shareholders." The Court stated
that this language referring to a "substantial premium" was not mis-
leading as a matter of law because the premium received by the TSC
shareholders for their TSC shares may have been "substantial" de-
spite the lower valuation of the National warrants that appeared in
the Horblower letter 1 6  The second part of the proxy statement
that could have been misleading due to the omission of the Horn-
blower letter was the presentation of the current market values of
the various securities involved in the merger transaction. Northway
argued that this presentation may have misled shareholders to make an
erroneous calculation of the expected premium. The Court, however,
felt that the determination of whether a shareholder would have been
led to make such a calculation in the absence of the information con-
cerning the lower value of the National warrants should be left to the
trier of fact and could not be resolved as a matter of law.'
17
Thus, in its consideration of the omission of the information in
the Hornblower letter, the Court made clear that the issue of whether
a misstatement or omission in a proxy statement was misleading is
113. Id. at 458.
114. Id. at 459-60.
115. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1976).
116. 462 U.S. at 458-59.
117. Id. at 459-60.
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a separate issue of fact that must be resolved before the three-step
factual determination of materiality can be reached. 8 The Supreme
Court's disposition of this issue, then, does not contribute to an
understanding of the analysis to be used in determining materiality.
4) Purchases of National Common Stock by National and
Madison Fund. The Seventh Circuit had held that regardless of
whether the purchases by Madison and National had actually been
coordinated to support the market price of the National common
stock, the omission of information concerning these purchases was
material as a matter of law.119 The Supreme Court was concerned
that the Seventh Circuit's disregard of the issue of whether there was
actual market manipulation by Madison and National would lead to
the imposition of "civil liability on a theory that undisclosed informa-
tion may suggest the existence of market manipulation, even if the
responsible corporate officials knew that there was in fact no market
manipulation."'
20
The Court assumed that the purchases by Madison and National
were undisputed facts. However, the Court would not allow the in-
ference of market manipulation, which had been inferred from these
facts by the Seventh Circuit, to be drawn as a matter of law because
no showing had been made by Northway that manipulation had actu-
ally occurred. Rather, the presence of manipulation was an issue that
remained to be resolved by the trier of fact before the significance




A. Apparent Inconsistencies in the Court's Analysis
of Materiality
To summarize the above analysis of the Court's opinion, the
Supreme Court decided that materiality is to be determined in terms
of the probable causative effect upon shareholders of a misstatement
or omission in a proxy statement. Within the narrow factual situation
presented to it, the Court clarified how this causative effect must be
analyzed: the omitted or misstated fact must be undisputed or it must
be determined by the trier of fact; the inference to which this fact
would lead a reasonable shareholder must be found by the trier of
fact, except in circumstances in which reasonable minds could not
differ upon the inference to be drawn; finally, the significance of this
inference to a reasonable shareholder in deciding how to vote must
118. Id. at 460.
119. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
120. 426 U.S. at 462.
121. Id. at 462-63.
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be found by the trier of fact unless the information is "obviously
important."
122
The three-step scheme for determining materiality is extrapolated
from the opinion only with difficulty-although it is consistently applied-
and it contains two ambiguities or inconsistencies that must be ex-
plained. First, the Court's treatment of the middle step in the analysis
of materiality (the determination of the inferences to be drawn from a
fact omitted or misstated in a proxy statement) is susceptible of two
different interpretations. Early in the opinion the Court stated that
the second step in the determination of materiality is a factual de-
termination of the inferences that would be drawn by a reasonable
shareholder from the underlying facts alleged to be misstated or
omitted in the proxy statement. 23 This language indicates that the
trier of fact is to determine the inferences a reasonable shareholder
would draw based upon the information that would have been avail-
able at the time of the proxy statement had the misstatement or
omission not occurred. For example, if the purchases of stock by
National and Madison are the omitted facts, the question presented
to the trier of fact is whether a reasonable shareholder would have
inferred market manipulation from these facts. The factual determina-
tion of whether the inference of manipulation would have been drawn
by a reasonable shareholder would be made under the assumption
that the reasonable shareholder had access to the information in the
proxy statement plus the omitted information concerning the purchases
by National and Madison.
In discussing the omissions from the proxy statement relating to
the control and manipulation issues, however, the Court seems to
refer to a determination by the trier of fact based upon the facts
available at trial,1 24 not upon the facts available at the time of the
proxy solicitation; that is, the Court appears to be requiring proof of
the truth of the inference made from the information omitted from
the proxy statement, rather than proof that a reasonable shareholder
would have made the inference. For example, in discussing the
manipulation issue the Court states: "[I]f liability is to be imposed in
this case upon a theory that it was misleading to fail to disclose
purchases suggestive of market manipulation, there must be some
showing that there was in fact market manipulation."12s This can
be interpreted to mean that the Court is requiring proof at trial that
there was actual market manipulation by TSC and National, not proof
that a reasonable shareholder would have inferred manipulation from
the information available to him at the date of the proxy solicitation.
122. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
123. 426 U.S. at 450.
124. Id. at 453, 462-63.
125. Id. at 463.
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Thus, it is completely unclear from the Court's opinion which type
of factual determination comprises the second step of the materiality
analysis. There is language supporting both interpretations. The
language supporting the first interpretation, that the trier of fact
must decide what inference would be drawn by a reasonable share-
holder at the time the proxy statement was issued, is found in the
Court's opening statements and in a footnote that is dictum.1
26
The Court's discussion of the specific omissions in the case, however,
indicates that the trier of fact must determine whether the state of
facts to be inferred from the information misstated or omitted in the
proxy statement actually existed. 127 If the Court intends to require
;ctual proof of the second inference between the misstated or omitted
fact and the determination of its significance to a reasonable share-
holder's voting decision, the Court appears to be placing a formidable
barrier in the way of recovery under the proxy rules. This conclusion
leads to a consideration of the other apparent inconsistency in the
opinion.
The Court assigns to some facts a neutral value, not allowing them
to serve as a basis for a finding of materiality-even though those facts
are undisputed-unless they lead to an intermediate inference.'
28
Examples of these neutral facts in TSC are the information contained
in the SEC filings, Yarmouth's and Simonelli's positions on the TSC
board, and the purchases by National and Madison of National com-
mon stock. Examples of the intermediate inferences required by the
Court before a neutral fact may be the basis for a determination of
materiality are National's control of TSC and market manipulation by
National and Madison. If the Court is treating these intermediate
inferences as facts which must be proved at trial,129 an ambiguity
becomes apparent. The Court is willing to allow these inferences,
once they have become facts proved at trial, t.o be a basis for the
determination of materiality without interposing a middle step in the
analysis. The Court is differentiating between two types of facts, one
of which can lead directly to a determination of significance to the
reasonable shareholder while the other cannot. The distinction be-
tween the two types of facts drawn by the Court appears to be an
arbitrary one. A reason for the distinction can be found, however, if
the policy judgment forming the basis for the Court's theoretical
scheme for determining materiality is explored.
B. The Policy Behind TSC
The Court's underlying concern in TSC was that the concept of
126. Id. at 450, 453-54 n.15.
127. Id. at 453, 462-63.
128. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 123-27 supra.
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materiality, and thus the danger of liability, was being broadened
through the use of the "might" standard by the lower courts. 130
The potential liability for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed,
and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the
corporation and its management be subjected to liability for insignificant
omissions or misstatements, but also management's fear of exposing itself
to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholder in an
avalanche of trivial information-a result that is hardly conducive to in-
formed decisionmaking. Precisely these dangers are presented, we think,
by the definition of a material fact adopted by the Court of Appeals in
this case. ... 131
The Court was not alone in perceiving this danger. One writer,
commenting on the Seventh Circuit's TSC decision, noted that the
case stood for an extraordinarily low threshhold of liability and
wondered if the " 'reasonable stockholder' who provides the only
safety valve in [TSC's] 'might have been' test might (or would) not
become 'unreasonable.' ,,132
Even a few lower courts had become aware that the language used
by the Court in Mills and Affiliated Ute could be utilized by a court to
grant relief for minor defects in disclosure.
While these verbal formulations by the courts and the SEC taken indi-
vidually fail to prescribe a precise standard, they do evince a trend
toward broadening the definition of materiality and concomitantly raising
the requirement of disclosure where the law requires full disclosure.133
The breadth of the "might" standard caused at least two circuits to
reject the standard before the Supreme Court did so in TSC. In
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. the Second Circuit pointed out that
Mills and Affiliated Ute dealt with reliance and stated that,
[w]hile the difference between "might" and "would" may seem gossamer,
the former is too suggestive of mere possibility, however unlikely. When
account is taken of the heavy damages that may be imposed, a standard
tending toward probability rather than toward mere possibility is more
appropriate.
34
The Fifth Circuit, in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., refused to "re-
lax the standard of materiality to a mere possibility of influence
upon a reasonable investor, a standard implied by the word 'might,'"
and noted that the Supreme Court had not considered the ramifications
of its language in Mills and Affiliated Ute.'35
130. 426 U.S. at 448-49.
131. Id.
132. Kirkland, Misleading Proxy Statements-The Seventh Circuit Strengthens the Minority
Stockholder's Rule 14a-9 Action: Northway v. TSC Industries, 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), 31
Bus. LAw. 1449, 1457 (1976).
133. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
134. 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973).
135. 489 F.2d 579, 604 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Several courts had used the "would" and "might" standards
interchangeably or had stated that there was no difference between
the two.' 36  Courts that applied the "might" test of materiality gen-
erally arrived at results that could also have been reached under the
"would" test articulated in TSC.137  However, in at least two dis-
trict court cases a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was
granted in situations in which the Supreme Court's three-step ma-
teriality analysis would likely have produced different results."'
In deciding TSC the Supreme Court may have been concerned
about the broadening of the materiality standard for a very specific
reason. The use of the "might" standard by the lower courts may
have been perceived by the Court as an indication that the federal
courts were becoming too involved in the supervision of corporate
behavior, an area traditionally governed by state corporation law.
This type of extension of the federal securities laws to reach behavior
other than faulty disclosure has been widely noted.
13 9
The disclosure requirements of the SEC rules are susceptible to
use by plaintiffs who have no interest in more complete disclosure but
who wish to gain relief for some corporate transaction that has caused
them injury. For example, the plaintiff in TSC may have been con-
cerned about the possible unfairness of the merger transaction between
TSC and National. It may have tried to use the disclosure require-
ments of the proxy rules to attack the merger indirectly because, for
one reason or another, the outcome of a direct attack on the merger
under state corporation law was uncertain. An example of this strat-
egy is presented by a recent decision involving Northrop Corporation,
in which a proxy rule violation was used to force settlement of a claim
relating to illegal campaign contributions. 140  The plaintiffs in that
136. Eg., Jansky v. Miller, 474 F.2d 365, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1973); Ross v. Longchamps,
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434, 441 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
137. See, e.g., Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973);
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812 (D. Del. 1974); Kaufmann v.
Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Puma v. Marriott, 363 F. Supp. 750 (D. Del.
1973); Allen v. Penn Central Co., 350 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972); First Sur. Corp. v,
Community Bank, 337 F. Supp. 667 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D.
Del.), affid, 453 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1971).
138. See Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Colonial Realty Corp, v.
Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also Sonesta Int'l
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the Second Circuit,
which had applied the "would" standard in Gerstle a few weeks earlier, suddenly applied
the "might" standard.
139. See notes 16 and 18 supra; Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SE.C. 907 (1961); Kaplan,
Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAW. 86; (1963); Leaveil, Investment
Advice and the Fraud Rules, 65 MICH. L. Rav. 1569 (1967); Ruder, Pitfalls In the Development
of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 1Ob-5, 59 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 185
(1964).
140. Springer v. Jones, Civ. No. 74-1455-G, (C.D. Cal. 1975) stipulation and order re:
settlement.
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case were concerned about the campaign contributions, not the dis-
closure methods used by Northrop, but the disclosure requirements of
the proxy rules provided a convenient method of gaining relief in-
directly.
More specifically, the disclosure requirements of the SEC rules
are susceptible to use by plaintiffs desiring to attack corporate actions
that cannot be reached under state law. For example, Northway
might have known that it could not prove that TSC's management
had inadequately protected the TSC shareholders in its negotiations
with National; therefore, a breach of fiduciary duty could not be
proved, and relief in state court would not have been granted. Yet the
federal disclosure requirements provided a means to attack the be-
havior of the TSC management indirectly without the difficult proof
required in state court.
Two possible interpretations of the Court's opinion in TSC have
been suggested here with regard to the Court's ambiguous treatment
of the second step in its three-step analysis of materiality. The
Court required the determination of the inferences drawn from a fact
omitted or misstated in a proxy statement to be made in one of two
ways: 1) The trier of fact must decide what inferences a reasonable
shareholder would have drawn based upon the information that would
have been available at the time of the proxy statement, had the mis-
statement or omission not occurred; or, 2) The trier of fact must make
a determination of the truth of the inference based upon the facts
available at trial. Under the latter interpretation the Court is requiring
proof that the middle inference had an actual basis in fact and was not
merely one that would be drawn by a reasonable shareholder.1
4 1
If the Supreme Court's opinion is read as requiring proof that
the state of affairs to be inferred from the omitted information in a
proxy statement actually existed, the Court's purpose in differentiating
between neutral facts that cannot lead independently to a determina-
tion of materiality (such as Yarmouth's and Simonelli's positions
on the TSC board) and normeutral facts that can lead to a determina-
tion of materiality (such as manipulation and control)142 may have
been to ensure that plaintiffs do not use the federal courts to obtain
relief that would be denied in state court. The Court, by requiring
this proof of the middle inference in the materiality analysis, was
requiring the very type of proof that Northway may have sought to
avoid by bringing its action in federal rather than state court-e.g.,
proof that National controlled TSC and therefore sat on both sides
of the bargaining table. 143
141. See text accompanying notes 123-27 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
143. 426 U.S. at 452.
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By requiring proof of the nonneutral facts that serve as a basis
for a determination of materiality, the Court has tied the disclosure
requirements of the proxy rules to the type of behavior that is not
disclosed or that is inaccurately disclosed. It is submitted that the
Court distinguishes between neutral and nonneutral facts on the basis
of what behavior would trigger liability under state corporation law
-e.g., breach of fiduciary duty by the management of TSC. By in-
serting this middle step in the determination of materiality, the Court
has placed a buffer between corporate nondisclosure and liability
that in effect requires plaintiffs to prove culpable behavior as well as
nondisclosure; and by requiring proof of the type of behavior that
would have to be proved in an action under state corporation laws,
the Court may be effectively eliminating the plaintiff's advantage
thought to be obtainable under the federal securities laws.
1 44
Thus, the Court has arguably inserted an element into a rule 14a-9
cause of action that has no basis in the rule or in section 14(a). Not
only must the plaintiff prove that a material misstatement or omis-
sion has appeared in the defendant's proxy statement but also that the
defendant has engaged in culpable conduct similar in nature to a
violation of state law. The use of a narrow standard of materiality
to limit the scope of rule 14a-9 would be more defensible had it not
involved the judicial legislation engaged in by the Court in TSC.
The TSC decision indicates that the Supreme Court may be at-
tempting to draw a more distinct line between the federal protection
of investors, which is accomplished through disclosure requirements,
and state supervision of the relative rights of the constituents of the
corporate entity. Although this is not apparent from the TSC de-
cision alone, there have been several recent Supreme Court decisions
that may be viewed in conjunction with TSC as an attempt to limit
federal securities regulation to securities and to leave corporation
law to the states.
145
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores the Supreme Court
affirmed the rule announced in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 146
that a private damage action under rule lOb-5 can be bropght only by
purchasers and sellers of securities. 147 This rule had previously been
144. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
145. For a suggestion that the Supreme Court is attempting to limit the class of plaintiffs
able to gain relief under the federal securities laws, see 10 GA. L. REv, 1059 (1976).
146. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
147. 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
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adopted by four circuits, but its limitations on standing to sue had been
largely eliminated by means of various broad exceptions to the rule . 48
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit had explicitly rejected the Birn-
baum rule in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.149  The
Supreme Court was concerned about the huge class of plaintiffs to
which the rule lOb-5 remedies were being made available. Conse-
quently, it viewed the Blue Chip Stamps case as an opportunity to
point out that effective remedies exist under state law for corporate
mismanagement and for securities law violations. 50 As one commen-
tator has noted: "One of the consequences of Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores . . . will be the slackening, at least temporarily,
of these pressures to extend lOb-5 to cover situations that are more
'management-misbehavior' than 'market-manipulation' oriented."151
The Supreme Court has further limited the class of plaintiffs
who may obtain relief under the federal securities laws in Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.15 2 This complicated litigation concerned
an attempt by Chris-Craft Industries to gain control of Piper Aircraft
Corporation that was successfully repelled by the Piper family, Ban-
gor Punta Corporation, and First Boston Corporation (Bangor Punta's
underwriter). Chris-Craft brought suit under section 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' which forbids material misstate-
ments or omissions in connection with any tender offer, and under
rule lOb-6,15 4 which prohibits issuers whose stock is being distributed
from manipulating its price by purchasing the stock or rights to pur-
chase the stock.
Most relevant here is the Supreme Court's disposition of Chris-
Craft's claim under section 14(e). The Court held that section 14(e)
was intended to protect investors confronted with a tender offer by
ensuring adequate disclosure; it was not intended to protect frustrated
tender-offerors.' 55 Although Chris-Craft owned 42% of the Piper stock,
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
148. See Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Wiere Standing to Sue
Under Rule lOb-5 is Involved, 20 BuFFALo L. REv. 93, 94-96 (1970); 44 FORDHAMt L. REV. 452,
454 (1975). The Birnbaum rule was adopted by the Third Circuit in Landy v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); by the
Fifth Circuit in Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1974); by the Sixth
Circuit in Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1970); by
the Eighth Circuit in City Nat'l. Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221. 227-28 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
149. 490 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
150. 421 U.S. at 738 n.9.
151. Vagts, The Governance of the Corporation: The Options Available and the Power to
Prescribe, 31 Bus. LAw. 929, 937 n.26 (1976).
152. 97 S. CL 926 (1977).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1976).
155. 97 S. Ct. at 946.
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the Court stated that Chris-Craft had not sued as an injIured share-
holder but as a defeated tender-offeror1 56 The Court further noted
that Chris-Craft had a possible remedy in state court for "interference
with a prospective commercial advantage" and that this was a factor in
determining that Chris-Craft had no remedy under section 14(e) as a
defeated tender-offeror.1
57
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder the Supreme Court once again re-
versed the Seventh Circuit and indicated that proof of some form of
"intent to decive, manipulate, or defraud" on the part of the defendant
is necessary to impose civil liability in a private action under rule
l0b-5.1'58 The Court noted that a standard of negligence would "signifi-
cantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability
upon accountants and other experts who perform services or express
opinions with respect to matters under the Acts."'159 The Court then
referred to its language in Blue Chip Stamps that expressed a similar
fear of extending recovery under rule lOb-5 too broadly.1 60  As one
commentator has noted: "The Court's decision . . . seems to indicate
a desire to restrict the remedies made available by the antifraud legis-
lation that has, heretofore, been construed flexibly, and not restric-
tively or technically."' 6
1
That the TSC decision indicates the intent of the Supreme Court
to limit the coverage of the federal securities laws is most directly
supported by Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green."'2 In that case, Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. obtained 100% ownership of Kirby Lumber Corp.
pursuant to section 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law,163 a "short-
form" merger statute not requiring the consent of or advance notice to
minority shareholders. Minority shareholders of Kirby were notified
of the merger and given an information statement that disclosed all
relevant information concerning the transaction the day after its con-
summation. 64  They chose to attack the merger in federal court
under rule 1Ob-5 rather than to use their appraisal remedy in the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery. 65 The plaintiffs advanced two arguments in
support of their claim that defendant Santa Fe had used a device to de-
fraud them in violation of rule lOb-5(a): 1) the merger lacked a busi-
ness purpose and was undertaken without prior notice to the minority
156. Id. at 946-47.
157. Id. at 949.
158. 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
159. Id. at 214 n.33.
160. Id. at 214-15 n.33.
161. Murdock, Birnbaum Revitalized: New Life for Motions to Dismiss in 10b-5 Actions
for Damages, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 663, 686.
162. 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977).
163. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1975).
164. 97 S.Ct. at 1297.
165. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1975).
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shareholders; 2) the value placed on the shares held by the minority
shareholders was fraudulently low.1
66
While the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim, 167 the Second Circuit reversed and stated that rule lOb-5
reaches "breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority
shareholders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of dis-
closure." 168  Therefore, the Second Circuit reasoned, allegations that
the merger had no business purpose and was undertaken without
notification to the minority shareholders constituted a proper basis for
a claim under rule l0b-5(a). 69
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, stating that a
breach of fiduciary duty is not encompassed by the terms "manipula-
tive or deceptive" as those terms are used in section 10(b) of the
1934 Act.x7  Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejected the minority
shareholders' claim that the failure to give advance notice- of the mer-
ger was a material nondisclosure in violation of rule 10b-5(b).' The
Court stated that Delaware law does not require prior notification,
and that notification would have been no help to the minority share-
holders since their sole remedy under Delaware law for the alleged
unfairness of a merger was an appraisal proceeding in the Delaware
Court of Chancery. "Thus the failure to give advance notice was not a
material nondisclosure within the meaning of the statute or the
Rule." 172  The Court in Santa Fe appears to be saying that the non-
disclosure was not material because it was not a violation of state law.
The opinion contains a lengthy discussion of the necessity of separating
federal securities law from the state regulation of internal corporate
matters.
Absent a clear indication of Congressional intent, we are reluctant to
federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals
with transactions in securities, particularly where established state poli-
cies of corporate regulation would be overridden.17
166. 97 S. Ct. at 1298.
167. 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
168. 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976).
169. Id. at 1291.
170. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any securitiy
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest for the protection of investors.
171. 97 S.Ct. at 1301-02.
172. 97 S.Ct. at 1301 n.14.
173. Id. at 1303-04. For further recent cases in which the Supreme Court has shown a
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It is noteworthy in this regard that the Court makes specific reference
to TSC.174  Thus, the TSC decision indicates that the Supreme Court
may wish to impose limitations upon a 14a-9 action similar to those it
has imposed in the lOb-5 area.
175
V. CONCLUSION
The TSC decision ended a controversy spawned by the Supreme
Court over the legal definition of materiality. The Mills and Affiliated
Ute decisions had been interpreted by several courts to mean that the
Supreme Court was adopting the "might" standard of materiality.
The Court dispelled this notion in TSC by holding that the materiality
6f a, statement or omission in a proxy statement is to be determined on
the basis of what a reasonable shareholder would consider important.
Furthermore, the Court made clear that the "would" standard of
materiality is an objective test of vote-causation that replaced the
subjective test of vote-causation, reliance, eliminated in Mills as an
element of a 14a-9 action.
The Supreme Court also intimated in TSC that the federal
securities laws do not offer unlimited protection to shareholders. The
opinion evidences a desire to limit the relief available under rule 14a-9
in order to leave the supervision of corporations to the states.
Suzanne Miller Koesiner
tendency to defer to state policies in the regulation of corporations, see Cort v. Ash, 422 u.S
66, 78, 84 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
174. 97 S. Ct. at 1301 n.14.
175. That the reasoning of TSC is applicable to lob-5 cases in which materiality is an
issue is illustrated by S.D. Cohn & Co. v. Woolf, 426 U.S. 944 (1976), in which a lob-5 case was
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of TSC The
Fifth Circuit had indicated that the proper test of materiality was the "might" standard,
citing Affiliated Ute. Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Wheat
v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1976); Goldsholl v. Shapiro, 417 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
S.E.C. v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
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